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ISSUE PAPER
DOES THE RULE OF REASON VIOLATE THE
RULE OF LAW?
Maurice E. Stucke*
A "key feature" of all industrial market systems, according to
the World Bank, "is a strong state that can support a formal
legal system that complements existing norms and a state that
itself respects the law and refrains from arbitrary actions."'
Under the rule of law, enforcement authorities apply clear legal
prohibitions to particular facts with sufficient transparency,
uniformity, and predictability, so that private actors can
reasonably anticipate what actions would be prosecuted and
fashion their behavior accordingly. The law should be sufficiently
specific and its enforcement predictable and fair. With clear
standards, market participants can channel behavior in welfare-
enhancing directions and better predict their rivals' behavior.
Clear standards reduce transaction costs, rent-seeking behavior
by market participants, and decision errors by the antitrust
agencies and courts. The rules are sufficiently prospective,
accessible, and clear to constrain the government (both the
executive and judiciary) from exercising its power arbitrarily.
Impartial courts can quickly and economically enforce the law,
which applies to all persons equally, offering equal protection
without prejudicial discrimination.
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. This issue
paper summarizes the arguments made in my more detailed article, Does the
Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1267359.
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 4 (2002).
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A. Rule of Law as a Precondition for Effective Antitrust
Enforcement
If the rule of law is a necessary prerequisite for an
effective free market, then the competition laws, which seek to
maximize the benefits from a free market economy while
minimizing the attendant risks of (and correcting any) market
failure, should comport with these rule-of-law principles. (To
argue otherwise renders this illogical conclusion: The law
generally must comport with these rule-of-law principles for our
market economy to function properly; but competition law,
which directly governs market behavior, is somehow exempt.)
Competition laws help create the rules of the game. If the
competition rules enhance welfare and outline with sufficient
clarity what is impermissible, then all can rely on these rules in
channeling their behavior in welfare-enhancing directions. For
example, firms have certain expectations of the boundaries of
their competitors' behavior. Suppose a competitor abides by the
competition rules (and incurs costs to do so), while its rival cheats
(and seeks a competitive advantage). Failure to uniformly enforce
the rules will invite others to cheat. Without rules yielding
predictable legal outcomes, firms may refrain from welfare-
enhancing activity and opt for less efficient forms of doing
business. Alternatively, competitors may engage in socially
harmful activity but rely on lawyers and lobbyists to try to clear
them of legal difficulties. The rule of law can reduce the negative
welfare effects associated with such rent-seeking activities. As
Friedrich August von Hayek frames it, "[t]he important thing is
that the rule enables us to predict other people's behavior
correctly, and this requires that it should apply to all cases -
even if in a particular instance we feel it to be unjust."2
Although competition rules can help fix the rules of the
game, and proscribe specific actions deemed socially undesirable,
the government is not exogenous to the free market. The laissez-
faire approach is to exclude the government from the market. But
the law, as a positive force, provides the needed scaffolding for a
market economy; it facilitates commerce and economic growth.
Thus, the rule of law enables political institutions to "provide the
necessary underpinnings of public goods essential for a well-
functioning economy and at the same time limit the discretion
and authority of government and of the individual actors within
2 F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 114 (U. Chicago Press 2007)
(1944).
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government."'3
Clear antitrust rules also mitigate the lack of knowledge
and information problems that can lead to decision errors. With a
general totality-of-economic-circumstances standard, the current
administration may be more sympathetic to one industry or firm
than another. As Hayek warned, a vague standard fosters
central-planning and concentrates more power in the hands of the
privileged. As central planning "becomes more and more
extensive, it becomes regularly necessary to qualify legal
provisions increasingly by reference to what is 'fair' or
'reasonable' . . . [T]his means that it becomes necessary to leave
the decision of the concrete case more and more to the discretion
of the judge or authority in question."4
Not surprisingly, the OECD's ideal characteristics of a
competition standard dovetail with rule-of-law principles. An
antitrust legal standard should promote:
Accuracy (the standard should minimize false positives
and negatives),
Administrability (standard should be easy to apply),
Consistency (standard should yield predictable results),
Objectivity (standard should leave no subjective input
from the decision-makers),
Applicability (the wider the scope of conduct the standard
can reach the better), and
Transparency (the standard and its objectives should be
understandable).'
B. Rule of Reason's Infirmities Under Rule-of-Law Principles
So how does the rule of reason, the "prevailing,"6 "usual"7
and "accepted standard"' for evaluating conduct under the
Sherman Act, fare under these rule-of-law principles? Poorly. In
the past few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has complained about
3 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 85 (Princeton U. Press 2005).
4 HAYEK, supra note 2, at 116.
5 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION ON THE MERITS 23
(2005), available at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf.
6 See Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
7 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 881-82 (2007).
' Id. at 885.
2009
Loyola Consumer Law Review
the state of federal antitrust law. The Court decries antitrust's
"inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase," as hopelessly
beyond effective judicial supervision.9 The Court complains that
antitrust's per se illegal standard might increase litigation costs
by promoting "frivolous" suits.' ° It fears the "unusually" high risk
of inconsistent results by antitrust courts."
But who created this predicament? The-Supreme Court
did. Over the past ninety years, the Court has supplied the
Sherman Act's legal standards. In determining the legality of
restraints of trade, the Supreme Court generally employs either a
per se or rule-of-reason standard. 2 The rule of reason involves a
"flexible" factual inquiry into a restraint's overall competitive
effect, and "the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the
restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed."'3 The rule of
reason also "varies in focus and detail depending on the nature of
the agreement and market circumstances."'4 "Under this rule the
fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing
an unreasonable restraint on competition."'5 Despite its label, the
rule of reason is not a directive defined ex ante (such as a
speeding limit). Instead, the term embraces antitrust's most vague
and open-ended principles.
9 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quoting Asahi
Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003));
see also CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, MINUTES 32 (Nov. 8-9, 2007),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV1 1-2007-min.pdf
(demonstrating that court "spent some time decrying the enormous burdens
that could be imposed by [antitrust] discovery, and in doubting the possibility
that effective management of staged and focused discovery can be used to
enable a plaintiff to determine, at relatively reasonable cost to the defendants,
whether information exclusively available to the defendants can be used to
supply a better preliminary fact showing that will justify full-scale discovery
and litigation").
1o Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895.
1 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281-82
(2007).
12 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 1.2, at 3-4
(2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf
[hereinafter COLLABORATION GUIDELINES].
13 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States,'435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
14 See COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 4; United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rule of reason
also governs most monopolization claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
" Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
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Moreover, since 1977 the Supreme Court has narrowed
the scope of its per se rule. The Court overturned its per se rule
for vertical, non-price restraints in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.,6 for vertical maximum resale price maintenance
("RPM") in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 7 and for vertical minimum
RPM in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 18 But
in shedding its earlier per se rule, the Court has not offered clear
objective rules. Instead, the Court retreated to its rule-of-reason
standard.19  The Court's totality-of-economic-circumstances
standard has drawn heavy criticism over the past 97 years, even
by the Court itself:20
The rule of reason has long been criticized for its
inaccuracy, poor administrability, subjectivity, lack of
transparency, and yielding inconsistent results. In addition, the
rule of reason provides little predictability to market participants.
It subjects litigants and trial courts to the purgatory of
"sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming" discovery." For
example, a per se price-fixing claim under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act requires proof of an agreement.22 But for all other
non-hard-core restraints, the rule of reason applies.
Under the lower courts' more "structured" rule of reason,
antitrust plaintiffs (including the federal antitrust agencies) must
not only prove an agreement. They must also establish that the
challenged restraint has had substantial adverse effects on
competition, such as increases in price, or decreases in output or
quality. Absent direct evidence of anticompetitive effects,
plaintiffs can demonstrate the restraint's likely anticompetitive
effects by showing defendants' "market power" as inferred from
their high market share within a properly defined product and
geographic market. 3 Such market definition, in turn, entails
I6 d. at 57-59.
17 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
'8 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885.
'9 Id. at 885-65; Khan, 522 U.S. at 10; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 n.15.
20 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.'S. 1, 5 (1958).
21 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6. This also assumes that uncertainty
provides no advantage to either private plaintiffs or defendants. In reality,
uncertainty may favor the players with greater resources or alternative means
to resolve their disputes.
2 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59
(1940).
23 The burden is on the antitrust plaintiff to first define the relevant
market within which the alleged significant anticompetitive effects of the
defendant's actions occur. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238
2009
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issues of cross-elasticity of demand, 4  as well as supply
substitutability into those markets, and ease of entry.
After plaintiffs meet their initial burden, the burden of
production shifts to defendants to provide a pro-competitive
justification for the challenged restraint (including the extent to
which the restraint increased productive efficiencies, lowered
marginal costs, and yielded pro-competitive benefits to
consumers).26
If the defendants, offer pro-competitive business
justifications, plaintiffs can respond by showing the defendants'
pro-competitive justifications as pretextual, that lesser restrictive
alternatives exist for the challenged restraint or that the restraint
is not reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competitive
objectives.27
And if plaintiffs' rule of reason claim survives to this
point, plaintiffs must show that the restraint's anticompetitive
effects outweigh its pro-competitive benefits.28 The fact finder
then engages in a "careful weighing of the competitive effects of
the agreement-both pro and con-to determine if the effects of
the challenged restraint tend to promote or destroy
competition. 9
(2d Cir. 2003).
24 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)
(relevant geographic market is the area in which a potential buyer may
rationally look for the goods or services he or she seeks); United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) (relevant product market
is defined as "those commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for
the same purposes"); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.1 (1992 & rev. 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm#ll (outlining product
market definition for horizontal mergers).
25 Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
modified, 183 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
26 Visa, 344 F.3d at 238. Only after the antitrust plaintiff has met its
initial burden does the burden of production shift to the defendant, who only
then must provide a pro-competitive justification for the challenged restraint.
27 Id.
28 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 507
(2d Cir. 2004); Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019
(10th Cir. 1998).
29 Geneva Pharm. Tech., 386 F.3d at 507; see also Visa, 344 F.3d at
238; Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004); Nat'l Hockey League Players' Ass'n
v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003); Tanaka
v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001); Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
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To prevail under the rule of reason, antitrust litigants
generally offer competing economic expert testimony. To
confound matters further, the experts' neo-classical economic
theories are often premised on "rational" profit-maximizing
behavior. These theories, as the burgeoning behavioral economics
literature reflects, may be divorced from marketplace realities.
Over the next decade, the rule of reason's infirmities will likely
worsen. The courts will weigh not only conflicting testimony by
Industrial Organization economists but conflicting economic
theories, with the rise of behavioral, evolutionary, and New
Institutional Economics.
Under the Court's flawed economic theories, antitrust
standards will continue to stray further from rule-of-law
principles. Evolving (and disputed) economic theory cannot
provide the requisite rules for civil and criminal illegality. As one
study of the antitrust laws puts it, "[1]egal requirements are
prescribed by legislatures and courts, not by economic science."30
Each new economic "wisdom" can affect criminal liability under
the Sherman Act. Neo-classical economics cannot predict myriad
behavior across markets today. Given many markets' dynamic
nature, courts cannot expect to optimize allocative efficiency
through its rule of reason. Despite claims of being descriptive in
nature, any economics-based competition policy ultimately is
normative. Subjective value judgments underlie "objective"
economic standards, and the objectives vary.31 Legal standards
that are premised on the Court's assessment of the latest
prevailing economic thinking simply afford too much discretion
to the judiciary.
C. Rule of Reason's Infirmities Under Rule-of-Law Principles
Have Significant Implications on Antitrust Enforcement and
Competition Policy
The rule of reason's deficiencies have significant
implications for antitrust enforcement and competition policy
30 STANLEY N. BARNES ET AL., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 316 (1955); see also
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 914. ("[A]ntitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely
replicate economists' (sometimes conflicting) views")(Breyer, J., dissenting).
31 ADVOCACY WORKING GROUP, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,
ADVOCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY REPORT 25 (2002), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/OutreachToolkitlmedia/asset
s/resources/advocacyreport.pdf (survey of 33 members identified 10 policy
objectives regarding monopolistic behavior).
2009
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generally. One implication is, because a rule-of-reason case is so
costly to try, fewer cases will be brought. This is significant
because private plaintiffs have brought the overwhelming
majority of antitrust cases over the past thirty years. Concerned
about expenses, plaintiffs with meritorious claims may forego
antitrust litigation.32 Since the Court's Sylvania decision, there
are fewer private federal antitrust cases. Fewer antitrust cases are
now brought annually relative to total litigation. Some
enterprising plaintiff lawyers seek redress under state business
tort claims. Others abandon their client's antitrust claims and
forego litigation altogether.
A second effect on antitrust enforcement and competition
is the potential loss of protection for consumers and smaller
competitors. An independent judiciary and the rule of law may be
their only protections. Powerful firms may have little utility for
judicial redress of antitrust violations. Entrants with potentially
innovative technologies may lack comparable means of self-
preservation, and be foreclosed from the market, which is
troubling under an evolutionary economic perspective. Indeed, a
profit-maximizing competitor should opt for litigation when it
represents the least costly (or remaining) alternative. Neither
competitors nor consumers will be compensated for their antitrust
injuries.
Third, the Court's choice of rules will affect future market
behavior (and its future rules) and the incentives for market
participants to engage in productive activity. As Douglass North
notes, how the game is actually played is a consequence of the
formal structure (e.g., formal rules, including those by the
government), the informal institutional constraints (e.g., societal
32 Expert economic testimony is often necessary for antitrust
plaintiffs to prevail under the rule of reason. Indeed, some have attributed
antitrust litigation's significant costs for economic experts as one factor for the
decline of antitrust claims and growth of business torts claims. One recent
survey of trial attorneys found generally that "[E]xpert witness fees are a
significant cost factor driving litigants to settle, ranking just slightly behind
.trial costs arid attorneys fees in that respect." INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. AT THE UNIV. OF DENVER & THE AM. COLL. OF
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY, INTERIM REPORT ON THE
JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL - SYSTEM 3-4 (2008), available at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=3650.
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norms and conventions), and the enforcement characteristics.33 A
market's performance characteristics are a function of these
institutional constraints. The rules will define the opportunity set
in the economy. Changing the game's rules can lead to different
outcomes. If the institutional constraints reward (or are
indifferent to) monopolization, monopolies will be the likely
outcome in markets conducive to monopolization.
Fourth, a suboptimal U.S. legal standard hinders global
convergence. "A key objective of international cooperation
between antitrust agencies is to achieve convergence as far as
possible (taking into account differences that might exist in each
jurisdiction), in rules and standards of review and remedies in
order to facilitate the conduct of business in a global
marketplace," reported the American Bar Association's ("ABA")
Antitrust Section.34 "Without such cooperation, inconsistent rules,
standards, procedures and remedies can serve as an obstacle to
business investment, growth, and economic expansion by
imposing regulatory burdens that are costly or even impossible to
reconcile."35 Given the rule of reason's shortcomings under rule-
of-law principles, it is difficult for U.S. competition authorities to
persuade other nations to converge to the rule of reason. Nor can
they plausibly argue that convergence is feasible as long as the
Supreme Court remains wedded to its rule of reason; nor can the
United States be of much assistance in having other nations
model their legal standards for competition on the United States'
legal standards.36
D. Recommendations to Align Antitrust's Legal Standards with
Rule-of-Law Principles
Over the past few years, the Supreme Court's approach to
the federal antitrust laws has taken a perverse twist. Lately, the
Court states that its rule of reason is the prevailing, usual and
accepted standard for evaluating conduct under the Sherman
Act. Then the Court uses the infirmities of its rule of reason (such
as high discovery costs and inconsistent outcomes) to restrict
31 NORTH, supra note 3, at 52.
-34 A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2008 TRANSITION REPORT
42 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2008/11-
08/obamabiden.shtml.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 18. An amorphous legal standard for some developing
competition authorities can also hinder enforcement and foster corruption.
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antitrust plaintiffs' access to (or increased the cost in accessing)
the courts, and ultimately governmental interference in the
marketplace. It is "hard to see how the judiciary can wash its
hands of a problem it created."37 The rule of reason's acceptance
did not arise independently from the Court. The Court created
the rule of reason and determined the scope of its application. It
could now create a new standard. When rule-of-reason analysis is
equated with per se legality (for the antitrust plaintiff's bar) or
uncertainty (for the defense bar), it signals the standard's
deficiencies.
While the Roberts Court has been active in deciding
antitrust issues, and addressing the risk of false positives under its
per se rule, the Roberts Court never assessed the deficiencies of its
rule of reason under rule-of-law principles.38 This assessment,
however, is critical. Although a perfectly realized rule of law may
be unattainable, antitrust standards must be reoriented toward
'7 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2630 (2008)
(discussing punitive damages).
11 In Leegin, for example, the Court noted the risk of false positives
under its per se rule against vertical price-fixing. 551 U.S. at 895. The Court
found that RPM may not always or almost always tend to restrict competition.
But the Court lacked any empirical basis as to the percentage of instances
when RPM is pro or anti-competitive or competitively neutral, and the
magnitude of benefits and harms. For example, if RPM were likely to be
anticompetitive 65% of the time, and likely to cause over $100 billion in harm,
while being procompetitive 20% of the time (with $10 billion in benefits), the
Court could decide whether the incremental administrative costs of a more
nuanced legal standard is worth its benefits. In addition, the Court never
addresses the risks of false negatives (and positives) arising from its rule of
reason, and the increase in administrative costs under the rule of reason. For
example, the Court opines that its per se rule "may increase litigation costs by
promoting frivolous suits against legitimate practices." Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895.
This is illogical. In determining that a certain restraint is per se illegal, the
Court has concluded that the practice is generally illegitimate. Thus, one
cannot fault antitrust plaintiffs for challenging such restraints. Indeed the
Sherman Act (or any state statute prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices)
could be faulted for promoting frivolous suits against legitimate practices.
Thus the proper response is providing a better legal standard that effectively
spares specific legitimate practices (such as providing a legal exception to the
per se rule in cases of new entry). Leegin, 551 U.S. at 918. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, the Court's rule of reason would only exacerbate
litigation costs, and thereby increase the risk of promoting frivolous suits
against legitimate practices. The rule of reason, given its far broader scope of
factual issues and defenses, increases litigation costs. Thus while defendants
face the same amount of antitrust damages under either a rule of reason or per
se standard, defendants under the rule of reason face higher litigation costs and
a less predictable result.
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rule-of-law ideals. I offer several suggestions toward that end.
First, the Supreme Court's antitrust standards should be
in accordance with the originally intended and understood
meaning of the directives of legitimate, democratically
accountable lawmaking authorities. Congress never drafted the
Sherman Act as a vehicle for the Court to advance its own
ideologies, nor those of certain economists. The Court should
refrain from announcing new policies based on its perception of
"modern" economic theory that run counter to the Sherman Act's
originally intended and understood meaning.. Reckless
statements, like one suggesting that monopoly pricing is an
important element of the free-market system,39 can lead to
uninformed competition policies that are inconsistent with the
citizens' preferences. To give content to the Sherman Act, the
Court should update its interpretation of the Sherman Act's
words in the light of its legislative history and of the particular
evils at which the legislation was aimed. Any trade-off or policy
pronouncement should come from Congress, rather than the
democratically unaccountable judiciary.
Second, the extreme standards (per se and rule of reason)
are unsatisfactory for evaluating many ordinary competitive
restraints. Rather than reflexively return to ground zero (namely,
the 1918 CBOT4 ° rule-of-reason factors), the Court should
endeavor to cast more intelligible rules that are consistent with
the Sherman Act's principles.
Given its infirmities under the rule of law, the full-scale
rule of reason should be limited to novel cases where the courts
have little experience with the challenged restraint. Even there,
the Court should build upon the lower courts' structured four-
step rule of reason and minimize the need for judicial balancing.
If properly applied, the rule of reason would minimize
contentious issues of market definition. Circumstantial evidence
of market power via market definition is a weak proxy for direct
evidence. If a challenged restraint has been in force for several
years, an antitrust plaintiff should identify the restraint's
anticompetitive effects. Thus, market definition would play a
very limited role. Rather than establishing defendants' market
power, it simply would provide some context as to the area of
trade or commerce that the anticompetitive restraint affects. By
3 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
4' Bd. of Trade of*Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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focusing on actual anticompetitive effects, the court need not
engage in tradeoffs. If the challenged restraint's net result, for
example, is higher prices and reduced output, it is difficult to
fathom offsetting pro-competitive justifications that defendants
can offer. Even if defendants could establish that the practice
fosters competition in another market, it is doubtful that the
courts and antitrust agencies .can quantify these pro- and anti-
competitive effects. The courts should not engage in further
trade-offs, which are beyond their competence or authority under
the Sherman Act. Ultimately, Congress should decide such trade-
offs.
Using market share as circumstantial evidence of market
power should be relegated to those few cases where the harm is
largely prospective (e.g., mergers under Section 7 or nascent
anticompetitive restraints). The antitrust plaintiff would establish
both the severity and probability of the alleged likely
anticompetitive effects, which the defendant can rebut with the
magnitude and likelihood of pro-competitive benefits.
On the other hand, except in extreme cases of hard-core
cartels or behavior with significant anti-competitive effects, the
courts should hesitate in categorically condemning any particular
practice without regard to its justification. Commonplace
restraints do not merit a rule of reason. Instead, the Court should
aim for differentiated rules that further the Sherman Act's
legislative aims. As several scholars have argued, in many cases,
simpler is better-especially when resources are scarce and the
increased complexity leads to slight marginal social benefits.41
The Court could begin with presumptions based on the
prevailing empirical evidence. One key issue (which the majority
in Leegin avoids) is the percentage of cases where RPM leads to
positive and negative effects. The Leegin Court fell into the
"never" fallacy: "Vertical agreements establishing minimum
resale prices can have either procompetitive or anticompetitive
effects, depending upon the circumstances in which they are
formed."42 But this is also true of horizontal agreements among
competitors to fix price, or of many possible criminal acts, like
homicide, which can be legal or illegal depending on the
surrounding circumstances. The fact that at times killing can be
justifiable does not justify the assessment of guilt under the rule
41 See, e.g., Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy
with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of "Per se Rules vs. Rule of
Reason," 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215, 229-33 (2006).
42 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894.
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of reason. A second issue is whether the new rule (in lieu of per se
liability) reduces or increases error and regulation costs. The
majority in Sylvania and Leegin rejected any standard less than
the full-blown rule of reason. Justice White in Sylvania,43 like
Justice Breyer in Leegin,44 offered an incremental shift away from
per se liability. Even if the majority of Justices had concerns with
the intermediary standard, they cannot assume that its
shortcomings are greater than the rule of reason's shortcomings.
Third, the Court cannot assume that better legal standards
will arise independently. The Supreme Court and lower courts
have not undertaken the empirical analysis to promote the
judiciary's understanding of the impact of the antitrust standards
(and decisions) on the marketplace. Nor can they, because their
view is limited to the evidence the parties supply; the courts do
not unilaterally revisit a particular industry to assess the impact
of their decision. Nor can academia and the private bar fulfill this
complex mission. Through division of labor and increased
specialization, knowledge has dispersed in today's society. This
dispersal "requires a complex structure of institutions and
organizations to integrate and apply that knowledge." 5 Collecting
information on how various markets work, and the impact of
restraints on those markets, entails high transaction costs.
Moreover, the relevant information is often nonpublic.
The U.S. competition authorities in the Obama
administration should now undertake this empirical testing and
learning. Unlike private litigants who are concerned with
prevailing and promoting their parochial interests, the
competition authorities are acting on the citizens' behalf. This
should make those authorities less ideological and more objective.
Consequently, to assist the courts in determining the proper legal
standard for evaluating certain restraints, the federal antitrust
agencies first must better comprehend how markets operate and
evolve. This requires more empirical analysis on the agencies'
part.
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 71 (proposed using market power as screen
and exception for infant industries: "Court need only hold that a location
clause imposed by a manufacturer with negligible economic power in the
product market has a competitive impact sufficiently less restrictive than the
Schwinn restraints to justify a rule-of-reason standard, even if the same weight
is given here as in Schwinn to dealer autonomy").
4' Leegin, 551 U.S. at 928 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (modified per se to
allow exception for more easily identifiable and temporary condition of new
entry).
45 NORTH, supra note 3, at 99.
